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Abstract
In this short note we argue that the state-of-art inverted index based public key searchable encryption
scheme proposed by Wang et al may not be completely correct by giving a counterexample.
1 Introduction
In INFOCOM 2015, Wang et al [1] proposed the first practical inverted index based public-key searchable
encryption scheme with support for multi-time search. In their paper, the correctness of the encryption
scheme is argued in Theorem 1, which states their scheme returns all the documents that contain the query
keyword(s). We point out if there are more than one keywords in the query, the scheme in [1] is possible to
return a document which does not contain all the queried keywords. We show this point by giving a simple
counterexample.
2 The Counterexample
In this section all notations and definitions are from [1]. Please refer to [1] for details.
• Setup(k): Suppose k = 4 (the parameters we choose here are too small to be secure enough, but
the correctness should also hold), and the data owner chooses two k-bit primes: p = 11 and q = 13.
Then the data owner generates the key pair (pk, sk) for the Paillier algorithm, in which n = pq =
143. The data owner also chooses the following parameters: a pseudorandom permutation f mapping
keyword/document identifiers to tags (in integers), and an invertible matrix M . For simplicity, we
assume all the keyword/document identifiers are integers. Again, no matter which parameter is chosen,
the correctness should be preserved.
• IndexGen(M , I): Suppose the inverted index I is given as follows:
tω3 = 3 I3
tω2 = 2 I2
tω1 = 1 I1 tσ11 = 6 tσ12 = 1
tσ21 = 2 tσ22 = 3
tσ31 = 1 tσ32 = 2
Here tσij = f(σij), and tωi = f(ωi) = i for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Also we have
f(Ω) = {1, 2, 3}, f(Σ) = {1, 2, 3, 6},
where Ω is the collection of keywords, and Σ is the collection of documents.
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The maximum length of all the inverted lists above is L = 2. Since each inverted list has the same
length 2, the data owner does not generate any random number for each list. Then the polynomials
for the lists can be obtained as follows:
P1(x) = (x − 6)(x− 1) = x
2 − 7x+ 6.
P2(x) = (x − 2)(x− 3) = x
2 − 5x+ 6.
P3(x) = (x − 1)(x− 2) = x
2 − 3x+ 2.
Then the data owner immediately has the polynomial vectors:
I1 = (1,−7, 6)
T .
I2 = (1,−5, 6)
T .
I3 = (1,−3, 2)
T .
Let I be (I1, I2, I3)
T . The data owner encrypts the coefficients in I by using Paillier algorithm to get
the encrypted index as I˜. Since tωi = i when i is 1, 2 or 3, we have the dictionary matrix:
MD =


1 8 27
1 4 9
1 2 3


The data owner outsources M ′D = M ·MD and I˜ to the cloud.
• TrapdoorGen(M ,Q): Suppose the query is Q = {1, 3}, i.e., to query the intersection of I1 and I3.
The search user generates two random numbers r1 and r2 from Z
∗
n such that neither of them is 1, 2 or
3. We will discuss the choice of r1, r2 later. Now the user can get the query polynomial as follows:
P ′Q(x) = (x− 2)(x− r1)(x − r2) = x
3 − (r1 + r2 + 2)x
2 + (r1r2 + 2r1 + 2r2)x − 2r1r2.
Thus its coefficient vector is
(1,−(r1 + r2 + 2), r1r2 + 2r1 + 2r2,−2r1r2).
Then the user sends the trapdoor to the cloud:
TQ = ((1,−(r1 + r2 + 2), r1r2 + 2r1 + 2r2) ·M
−1, Encpk(−2r1r2)).
• Query(I˜,TQ): The cloud server computes
V = TQ[1] ·M
′
D = (1,−(r1 + r2 + 2), r1r2 + 2r1 + 2r2) ·MD.
Substituting MD as before, we have
V = (r1r2 + r1 + r2 − 1, 2r1r2, 3r1r2 − 3r1 − 3r2 + 9).
Then the cloud server computes v′i = Encpk(vi) +h TQ[2], where +h denotes homomorphic addition in
ciphertexts (Paillier is a partially homomorphic encryption scheme):
V ′ = (v′
1
, v′
2
, v′
3
) = (Encpk(−r1r2 + r1 + r2 − 1), Encpk(0), Encpk(r1r2 − 3r1 − 3r2 + 9)).
Finally the server computes PR(x) = V
′ · I˜T and sends the polynomial PR(x) to the search user.
1
1Here is one doubt: Paillier encryption is not fully homomorphic, and hence it cannot support multiplication between two
ciphertexts. Thus the encrypted polynomial PR(x) cannot be directly computed by the cloud server. One possible solution
here is: the server sends V ′ and I˜ to the user and let the user decrypt them and compute the polynomial P ′
R
(x) in plaintext.
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• OT(PR): Upon receiving PR(x), the user decrypts the coefficients in PR(x) and restores the polynomial
as follows:
P ′R(x) = Decsk(v
′
1
)·P1(x)+Decsk(v
′
3
)·P3(x) = (−2r1−2r2+8)x
2+(4r1r2+2r1+2r2−20)x−4r1r2+12.
Clearly x = 1 is one root of P ′R(x) = 0. However note that it admits another root:
P ′R(x) = 2(x− 1)((−r1 − r2 + 4)x+ 2r1r2 − 6).
If r1 + r2 6= 4, then another root is
x2 =
2r1r2 − 6
r1 + r2 − 4
.
Suppose r1 = 5 and r2 = 7, then x2 = 8 will also be admitted as a root (document tag) by the search
user. However document tag 8 is not in either I1 or I3. Thus the result is incorrect. In fact, there are
many other choices of r1, r2 that also give incorrect roots. Here we list a few of them:
r1 r2 roots of P
′
R(x)
4 6 1, 7
6 8 1, 9
7 9 1, 10
5 15 1, 9
9 19 1, 14
9 27 1, 15
Note that since n = 143, all the r1 and r2 above are in Z
∗
n. All the incorrect roots are integers, and
thus the search user has no way to distinguish them as redundant roots.
3 Remarks
The counterexample above is not surprising since given two polynomials P1 and P2, the roots of their sum
P1 + P2 include the common roots of P1 and P2, but may not only contain them. In the proof of Theorem
1 in [1], it is not explained why the roots of Eq. (2) are exactly the common tags in the queried lists.
If the user only queries one keyword each time, then the scheme in [1] should be correct, since only one
list Ii is returned from the cloud server in the form of s · Ii, where s is some scalar. There is no summation
of polynomials and hence the roots are exactly the tags in Ii.
As a possible way to repair the scheme in [1] for multiple keyword search, the user may query the same
keywords for several times, and take the intersection of the returned document tags. However this is more
time-consuming, and it is not clear how many query times are enough to guarantee the correctness.
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